This paper is concerned with some corporate governance issues related to newly listed firms in China based on a sample of 329 firms commencing listing on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock exchange (SZSE) during the period from 1998 to 2000. We first investigate the impact of ownership change due to stock market listing on corporate performance. We consider four aspects of corporate performance: profitability, sales, leverage and employee productivity. Our research results indicate that, on average, profitability, sales and employee productivity have improved from pre-listing to post-listing. We further investigate the impacts of state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effects on corporate performance.
1.

Introduction
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that assure suppliers of finance get a return on their investment. Bai et al (2002) classify the mechanisms into two types: internal mechanisms which include factors such as the board of directors, executive compensations, ownership structure, financial transparency and adequate information disclosure, and externals mechanisms which include the market for caproate control, legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, product market competition.
The concept of corporate governance has developed over the past several decades primarily in developed market economies. However, the recent experiences of corporate scandals such as the Enron, Worldcom in the US, Parmalat in Italy and HIH in Australia have cast much doubt on the existing corporate governance system and mechanism in the Western countries. These scandals have helped to raise the public awareness of corporate governance and called for higher governance standards in the West. Corporate governance development is now recognised as essential to the successful transition to an efficient market system (Lin, 2001) .
Corporate governance has also gained unparallel importance in China since market reforms began in 1978 (Bai et al, 2002) . The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock exchange (SZSE) have been established in the 1990s and now China's stock markets have become the eighth largest in the world with market capitalisation of over US$500 billion. One important aspect of improving corporate governance in China is the privatisation. Many state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been successfully listed on the Chinese stock markets. This paper aims to investigate some issues related to the corporate governance by using data on 329 newly listed firms in SHSE and SZSE. Ownership change is one important internal corporate governance mechanism. We first examine the impact of ownership change due to stock market listing. We then address the impact of state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effects on corporate performance around the listing period. The state control and foreign ownership factors are part of the internal mechanisms of corporate governance. In contrast, the regulation factor is one of the external mechanisms of corporate governance. Obviously, there are many corporate governance factors which can be considered. However, due to the data availability, we only consider these three factors: state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation. We shall investigate the impacts of these factors on performance in three cases: pre-listing, post-listing and pooled data.
There are a few existing studies on the performance changes due to privatizations.
These include Megginson et al. (1994) , Boubakri and Cosset (1998) , Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) , D'Souza and Megginson (1999) and D'Souza et al (2001) . More recently, Sun and Tong (2003) evaluate the performance of 634 state owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on China's two exchanges upon privatisation in the period 1994-1998. We follow the methodology employed in these studies to consider the listing effect on corporate performance. However, the firms in our data commenced listing between 1998 and 2000. Thus our data are more recent compared to Sun and Tong (2003) . We shall compare our results on the listing effect with Sun and Tong (2003) .
A few papers on corporate governance in China exist in the literature. Xu and Wang (1999) investigate whether ownership structure has significant effects on the performance of publicly listed companies in China and in what way it does. It is found that ownership structure indeed has significant effects on the performance of stock companies in China. Chen (2001) examines the cross-sectional relation between ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of 434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Qi et al (2001) investigate whether and how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms is affected by their shareholding structure by using a sample of firms listed on SHSE from 1991 to 1996.
Our study is different from these studies as we focus on the newly listed firms and we investigate the possible changes in the corporate governance mechanism due to stock market listing.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the methodology for the study. Section 3 presents the empirical results. In Section 4, we summarise the key findings of this study.
Data and Methodology
In this paper, we seek to determine whether the stock exchange listing of Chinese firms is truly desirable and lives up to the expectations of the governments and development agencies for the performance of the newly listed firms. We are also concerned with the impacts of some corporate governance variables, namely, state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation. To this end, we employ two types of techniques: empirical study of the changes in performance due to listing and the regression analysis of the relationship between performance and the underlying corporate governance variables. Details of these two techniques are outlined after the data description.
Data
We follow the existing studies, in particular Sun and Tong (2003) 
Selection of performance variables
Before we further discuss our methodology, we need to select the performance measures for our study. We consider four aspects of the corporate performance:
profitability, output, sales and employee productivity. Our choices are largely dependent on the availability of data.
• Profitability
The firms considered in this paper all went through primary offerings instead of secondary offerings. In a primary offering, the government sells existing equities and receives all of the sales proceeds and the only effect on the firm comes from ownership change. Associated with the initial listing in Chinese stock markets, a firm normally increases its asset and equity accounts by an equal amount. Besides, after the initial listings, firms are allowed to have a right issue up to 30% of outstanding stocks annually (Yu and Ying, 20001) . Many firms issue new shares after the initial listing even there were no good investment opportunities. Therefore, it is common that a firm's capital and equity capital change dramatically in the years after the initial listing. Given this special situation, it is hard to use the return on asset (ROA) and return on Equity (ROE) to measure the profitability of a firm after its listing. Instead of using ROA and ROE, this paper, as in Sun and Tong (2003) , employs two other measures for the profitability: real net profit (RNP) and net profit margins or return on sales (ROS).
In this paper, RNP figures are first adjusted for inflation 1 , then normalised relative to the listing year where the listing year RNP is set to 1. This normalization can avoid the side effect due to the issues of new shares.
• Output
In this paper, we use the real sales (RS) figure to measure the output for each firm.
The real sales are based on the accounting sales figures and adjusted for inflation similarly as for RNP. The real sales are also normalized to 1 for the year of listing (Year 0).
• Leverage
We use the ratio of total liability to total asset as a measure for financial leverage.
Although the validity of this measure may suffer from the dramatic capital changes due to listing 2 , we do not have a better choice due to the lack of information on interest expense and cash flows before listing, we can not use other measures such as time interest earned and cash ratio etc.
• Employee efficiency
Improving the employee productivity and efficiency has been an aim for SOE reform in China. We are interested in how our sample SOEs behaved after listing in terms of employment levels and employee efficiency. To this end, we use three measures: the number of employees, the real sales per employee, and the real net profit per employee. Given that very few firms reveal their number of employees before the listing, we compare the post-listing employee figures with the listing year figures rather than the pre-listing figures.
The listing effect on performance
In this paper we mainly use the median of each performance variable to analyse the change in performance due to stock market listing. In the mean time, we also use the mean value of each variable as a reference.
To be more specific, we use the Wilcoxon signed rank test as our principal method of testing for significant changes in the performance variables. Note that we assume that the samples are independent. The Wilcoxon Z-test statistics are normal when both sample sizes are bigger than 25. This condition is easily satisfied given our total number of firms considered. 2 We note that this is the same problem plagues the use of ROA and ROE as performance measures.
In addition to the Wilcoxon signed rank test, we also use a proportion test to determine whether the proportion ( ) of firms experiencing changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing whether ). Given the large number of firms considered, finding that an overwhelming proportion of firms changed performance in the same direction may be at least as informative as a finding concerning the median change in performance.
State majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effect
We consider two indicators of ownership structures in this paper: state ownership and foreign ownership. If the state ownership of a firm at listing is more than 50%, it is classified as state majority control (SML). Otherwise, it is classified as non-state majority control, which means virtually dispersed ownership in most cases. In addition, we also consider the foreign ownership factor to investigate if there are any impacts on a firm's performance due to the existence of foreign ownership in Year 0.
For the regulation factor, we classify firms in the energy, public utilities, finance and telecommunication industries as regulated and all other firms are regarded as nonregulated.
We use a multi-linear regression approach to investigate the ownership structure and regulation effect on newly listed firms on the Chinese stock markets. We shall consider three cases: pre-listing, post-listing and the pooled data 3 . The purpose is to observe the effects of these factors on corporate performance as well as any their changes from pre-listing to post-listing.
Specifically, we use the cross-sectional data to run three groups of regressions to see the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure as well as If a firm is in a regulated industry, is set to 1, otherwise 0.
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We note that the R squared measures of these regressions are expected to be very low as there are much more important variables such as GDP or interested rates which have more explanation powers on the performance measures than these dummy variables. However, these regressions are sufficient and useful in serving the purpose of this paper which is to observe the significance of the variables . For the sake of simplicity, we do not use control variables as in Sun and Tong (2003) , for these regressions. 
The stock market listing effect
In this subsection we consider the listing effect on performance based on the whole sample of 329 firms. The results are reported in Table 1 . 5 It is widely documented that IPO firms outperform the market after the listing (see e.g. Ritter and Welch, 2004) . Also, there are normally dramatic changes in the assets and equity accounts due to listing. Hence the performance in Year 0 is rather abnormal. Thus we exclude the data of Year 0. can borrow easily at a favourite rate due to the state guarantee. After the listing, the borrowing opportunity costs go up and the firm may also have more channels to obtain funds. Consequently, the leverage ratio decreases from pre-listing to postlisting.
Compared to the pre-listing years, we see the employment level has little increase after listing as shown by the average and median of employment. This observation may be explained by the expansion of businesses after the listing which can be likely due to the economic booming for the past two decades. However, the Wilcoxon statistic shows that changes are insignificant. The Wilcoxon Z -test statistic reveal that real sales per employee after listing have increased significantly from the listing year.
In contract, the real net profit per employee has declined significantly from the listing year.
In summary, it is difficult for us to conclude the direction of employee efficiency changes after listing. a these figures are from the listing year figures due to the unavailability of pre-listing data. *** represents significant at 1%.
State majority control, foreign ownership and regulation effect
In this subsection, we use the multi-linear regression model to investigate if the state majority control (SMC), foreign ownership and regulation are significant in explaining performance variables. We consider three cases: pre-listing, post-listing and pooled data.
• Prelisting period Table 2 reveals that has negative coefficients for the regressions with and though only the coefficient for RNP is statistically significant.
This suggests that state majority control hurts corporate performance and it should be reduced. A similar but a stronger conclusion is obtained by Sun and Tong (2003) .
The positive coefficient of in the SMC ,
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LA regression implies that the relationship between state majority control and leverage is positive and weak.
The coefficients of are negative for all the four regressions. However, only the coefficient in is statistically significant. This could be due to the following reason as suggested by Sun and Tong (2003) . The firms that issue foreign shares typically have a large proportion of the total ownership of the firm in the form of state ownership. appears to be negatively related to performance. Further, the relationship between and leverage is slightly negative.
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Regulation effect is only significant to leverage ratio. This means firms in the regulated industries tend to have lower leverage relative to their total assets. The relationship between regulation and real net profit ( ) is negative, while the relationships between regulation and as well as are both negative. Thus it appears that the results regarding performance and regulation are mixed and no clear cut conclusion can be drawn. • Post listing period Table 3 The coefficients of REG are significant in both ROS and LA regressions. This means firms in the regulated industries tend have lower leverage relative to their total assets and higher ROS relative to non regulated firms. • Pooled data This suggests that SMC has an overall limited but negative impact on performance.
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FRN has negative coefficients for all the r regressions. Only the FRN coefficient in the LA regression is statistically significant. This implies that FRN has overall negative impacts on performance and strong negative impact on leverage ratio.
Regulation effect is only significant to the leverage ratio. This means regulated firms tend to have lower leverage relative to their total assets. The impact of regulation on performance is somewhat mixed, with negative impact on RS and positive impact on RNP and ROS. 1974 1961 1974 1972 In summary, our results show that there are some slight changes in the corporate governance mechanisms due to the listing event. In all three cases, it appears that regulation has a significant impact on firm leverage ratio. Foreign ownership is negatively related to the leverage ratio. SMC has a negative impact on performance before listing and the negative impact alleviates after listing. Regulation has a strong negative relationship with leverage.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we use the data on newly listed firms on the Chinese stock markets during the period from 1998 and 2000 to investigate the impact of the stock market listing and some corporate governance factors on corporate performance. The corporate governance factors considered in the paper are: the state majority control factor, foreign ownership factor, as well as regulation factor.
Compared to Sun and Tong (2003) , our study uses more recent data. Our results support that the listing event has significant impact on corporate performance. We find strong evidence for the improvement in real net profit and return on sales, real sales, as well as employee efficiency after listing. These are similar to previous conclusions in the literature. However, we also see some evidence of decrease in leverage after listing. In short, our empirical research provides significant supporting evidence for the stock market listing of Chinese firms which is part of the SOE reforms in China in the past two decades.
We also investigate the impacts of the state majority control factor, the foreign ownership factor and regulation factor on corporate performance. We see some weak evidence that the corporate governance mechanisms have changed slightly from prelisting to post-listing. In contrast to the evidence obtained in Sun and Tong (2003) , the state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation hardly show significant impact on the performance. However, our results do support that the regulation factor has significant impact on leverage all the time.
Overall, our results shed some light on the further reform of SOEs in China. Our results suggest that the stock market listing in China has been successful in terms of corporate performance. Thus the direction of SOE reform was correct and should be maintained for the future. Overall, the state majority control, foreign ownership and regulation factors have very limited impact on corporate performance. This suggests that these factors should not be a big concern for the further SOE reforms as far as corporate performance is considered. The sate majority control variable is overall negatively related to the performance measures used in this paper, thus it would be a good thing for corporate performance if the state majority control can be reduced at listing. This point is also supported by Sun and Tong (2003) .
Finally, we note that one should be cautious with the interpretation of the findings in this paper. The results should be understood in a suggestive rather than decisive way as with most studies on corporate governance. 
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